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The State Secrets Privileget
Military and diplomatic secrecy often conflicts with fair-
ness to litigants who are disadvantaged by their inability
to discover information 'withheld due to assertion of
the state secrets privilege. The author of this article
examines the issues involved in this conflict. He suggests
a proper role for the courts in determining the validity of
a claim of privilege and considers the weight to be ac-
corded the governmental assertion of that privilege. The
author follows with an examination of the privilege in
specific litigation contexts: the criminal case, civil cases
where the Government is the plaintiff, and civil cases
where the Government is the defendant. He then con-
cludes with a discussion of recent trends in the use of the
privilege, urging that the reasons for the privilege be
borne in mind in determining its utility in particular liti-
gation contexts.
James Zagel*
INTRODUCTION
The privilege of the Government to refuse to reveal military
or diplomatic information in court is universally recognized,
when disclosure would undermine national security. This privi-
lege, the state secrets privilege, should be distinguished from two
other privileges for governmental information: the privilege not
to reveal the identity of an informer, and the privilege not to
reveal "official information." Official information concerns the
internal affairs of the state, acquired by public officials in the
course of duty or transmitted from one public official to another
in the course of duty.2 A third privilege is the executive privilege
tThe opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and are not
intended to represent the views of the Office of the State's Attorney of Cook
County, Illinois.
*Assistant State's Attorney, Criminal Appeals Division, Office of the
State's Attorney, Cook County, Inois.
1. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Duncan v. Cammell,
Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624. See McConmucK, EvmEnrcn §§ 143-50 (1954);
8 WIGmaORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2378-79 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
2. UN noPr Ru=E OF EVIDFnc 84.
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which is often asserted to justify the executives personal refusal
to release informationY
The state secrets privilege and the official information, in-
former, and executive privileges do rest, however, on substantially
similar policies and give rise to similar doctrines. Consequently,
much of the following discussion is based on material and prece-
dents dealing with a privilege other than that of state secrets.
Parenthetically, the use of the word "privilege" in connection
with state secrets may be technically inappropriate, for at least
once the Supreme Court has forced the Government to withhold
information which it was quite willing to produce.' For our pur-
poses, however, we may assume:
The privilege belongs to the Government and must be asserted by it;
it can neither be claimed or waived by a private party. It is not to be
lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by
the head of the department which has control over the matter, after
actual personal consideration by that officer.5
This article examines the state secrets privilege as it exists
today and the various problems created when the privilege is
recognized 6 It also suggests a resolution of some of these prob-
lems. The kinds of documents or testimony that should be priv-
ileged as state secrets are considered in light of the relation of
secrecy to the national interest, the definitions and concepts used
in determining the need for secrecy, and the effect that courtroom
revelation has upon secrecy. The article then examines the court's
proper role in determining a claim of privilege by considering the
power to make and the propriety of making an independent
judicial decision on the claim of privilege. The article goes on to
deal with the status of the privilege in civil and criminal cases
where the Government is a party. For reasons of convenience,
exercise of the privilege where the Government is not a party is
S. See generally McComjICK, EvmFNCE §§ 143-50 (1954); 8 WIGMORE,
op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 2378-79; Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy:
An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957); Hardin,
Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 879 (1962).
4. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
5. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953).
6. See generally McComnIcK, EViENCE §§ 143-50 (1954); 8 WIGMORE,
op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 2378-79; Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in
Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1958); Haydock, Some Eviden-
tiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements, 61 Hnv. L.
REV. 468 (1948); Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of
Data Within the Control of Executive Departments, 3 VxD. L. REV. 73 (1949);
Street, State Secrets -A Comparative Study, 14 MODERN L. REV. 121 (1951);
Note, Evidence - Three Nonpersonal Privileges, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV. 194 (1954).
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examined in the section on the power of the courts to decide issues
of privilege.
I. THE ISSUES INVOLVED
Determining whether something should be privileged as a state
secret requires a balancing of interests. The public interest in
maintaining the secrecy of some military or diplomatic informa-
tion must be balanced against the public and private interest in
maintaining fairness and efficiency in litigation7 Most legal dis-
cussions of the privilege assume that the nature of the interests
at stake is clear to those who must determine whether or not to
recognize the privilege. This assumption is partly justified since
courts and lawyers are familiar with the values of an adequate
litigation system. But the legal profession rarely has occasion to
consider the interests served by governmental secrecy; this is the
province of the intelligence officer. The values and limitations of
military and diplomatic secrecy should therefore be examined 8
The primary focus of this examination will be on military secrecy.
The instances when purely diplomatic secrets are likely to be
tenaciously safeguarded are fewf
7. This problem has sometimes been referred to as a conflict between the
public interest in secrecy and the private interest of the litigant. See, e.g.,
Note, 10 OKLA. L. R Ev. 336 (1957). However, to so state the problem is to
eliminate it. See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1943).
8. Most state secrets involve military rather than purely diplomatic secrets.
The instances when purely diplomatic secrets are likely to be tenaciously
guarded are few. See Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 142
F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1956); cf. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38 (No.
14692e) (C.C. Va. 1807). Governmental privilege in administrative law is
treated in Carrow, supra note 6.
9. The infrequency of litigation involving purely diplomatic secrets may
be attributed to: (1) The military value of much of the highly sensitive diplo-
matic information; (2) the lack of a direct relationship between the diplomatic
establishment and the daily functions of the commercial community; (3) diplo-
matic acts tend to reveal quickly the underlying diplomatic workmanship;
those aspects of diplomacy that remain hidden usually involve arrangements
contingent on events with military overtones; (4) the need for diplomatic
secrecy is usually limited to the period of negotiation, normally of short dura-
tion. It is noteworthy that the State Department has had very few documented
instances of refusal to disclose information. House Comm. on Gov't Opera-
tions, Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies,
H.R. REP. No. 2084, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1960).
Most highly sensitive diplomatic information will also involve profound
considerations of national defense; thus, there will be an immediate interest in
preserving secrecy for military reasons.
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A. SECRECY AND TiE PUBLIC INTEREST' °
In considering secrecy and the public interest, one must dis-
tinguish between periods of peace and times of war. During a war
the necessity and benefits of secrecy are clear. Until very recently
wartime military secrets involved easily recognizable facts such
as the number and disposition of troops, strategy and tactics, and
designs for military machinery. During peacetime the military
establishment was relatively inactive and insulated.
Today, however, the military establishment cannot be
quiescent during peacetime. The technology of war is complex
and extensive. Large segments of industry are constantly occu-
pied with national defense. Thus, one must face the vital ques-
tions. How much secrecy is needed? What is the cost of too little
or too much secrecy?
Some secrecy in military matters is obviously essential to the
national defense, yet there are some very direct limits on its
value. First, secrecy has harmful effects on the democratic form
of government. Congress' ability to supervise the military estab-
lishment is a function of information. An uninformed Congress
must either abdicate its power to the knowledgeable or exercise
that power blindly. Even if Congress receives adequate infor-
mation, secrecy reduces the number of non-Government experts
from whom Congress may seek disinterested opinions. n Military
policy, like economic and foreign policy, is grounded on the values
and beliefs of the nation's citizens.' 2 As secrecy increases, the
10. See generally House Comm. on Gov't Operations, Availability of In-
formation from Federal Department8 and Agencies, H.R. REPs: No. 2084, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); No. 1224, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); No. 1187, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); No. 2578, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); No. 234, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); No. 1884, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); No. 1619, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); No. 157, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); No. 2947, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); STAPP or THE SPECIAL SuBcom. ON Gov'T IHNFonaf-
TION OF THE HOUSE Comm. ON Gov'T OrpmAToNs, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
FEDERAT STATUTES ON THE AvAIAi~urz OF INFORmATioN (Comm. Print
1960); Hearing Before the Subcommittee of Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 pts. (1958); Hear-
ings Before the Special Subcommittee of Government Information of the
House Committee on Government Operations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. & 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., 17 pts. (1955-59) [hereinafter cited Hearings].
11. Reference to pertinent congressional hearings will disclose that a very
small percentage of nongovernmental witnesses testify at congressional hear-
ings on military and intelligence affairs.
12. Katzenbach, Information as a Limitation on Military Legislation: A
Problem in National Security, 8 INT'L A's. 196, 205 (1954).
[Vol. 50:875
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availability of knowledge necessary for the public to make and
express a meaningful opinion decreases.
Second, secrecy inhibits the interchange of ideas and infor-
mation which is essential to scientific progressPa The detrimental
effects of secrecy are probably most notable in this area. "Secrets
represented by weapons already developed or even by plans in
laboratory files become insignificant in comparison with the im-
portance of new ideas and new concepts .... Secret research in
selected laboratories offers the poorest prospect for rapid
progress .... ,,14
Third, secrecy retards industrial development in new tech-
nological fields. So much advanced research is secret that many
investors understandably fear that a new enterprise based on
unclassified information is outdated or soon will become so. 5
Additionally, defense contracting based on secret technologies
bolsters monopoly 6
Fourth, secrecy is expensive to achieve and expensive to end.
The prohibitive cost of removing unneeded secrecy classifications
deters their removal.' Finally, secrecy results in less informed
executive and military personnel. If a rapidly changing situation
requires immediate action, it would be disastrous to rely on a
classification officer to promptly provide operating personnel with
all necessary information.
Clearly, governmental secrecy tends to hurt the nation, regard-
less of whether it harms the nation's enemies. Conversely, the
harm done to the nation's enemies by secrecy is short-lived, since
most modern technological secrets are based upon generally
known scientific laws. The amount of time in which a nation with
a pool of trained experts can duplicate foreign technical achieve-
ments is estimated to range from one to four years. 8
The significance of these considerations for the law of state
13. The advocates of military secrecy claim that no one should know who
does not have a "need to know." Air Force Reg. 205-1, § 1-14 (Oct. 5, 1964),
§ 4-3 (Jan. 5, 1966); Dep't of Defense Directive No. 5200.1, pt. 4 (Dec. 31,
1964). But, it is almost impossible to determine in advance when there is a
"need to know." Hearings 1058-59.
14. Hearings 728-29.
15. Beckerly, The Impact of Government Information and Security Con-
trols on Competitive Industry, 11 Buym. ATozmC SciIw~isTs 123 (1955).
16. See PANEL ON THE IMPACT OF THM PEACEFEU USES OF ATOr41C ENERGY,
84TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT TO THE Jonir Co ivnrEr ON ATozc ENERGY
105-09 (Comm. Print 1956).
17. Hearings 1025, 1057, 1064.
18. Hearings 725-922, 3435-564.
1966] 879
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secrets is not wholly clear, but the following implications seem
justified. First, generalizations on the values of governmental
secrecy will not necessarily simplify a specific decision whether a
given piece of evidence is a state secret. But such general obser-
vations may make a decision for disclosure easier in a borderline
case. Second, the failure of the Government to undertake the
expensive program of systematic declassification allows one to
reject the suggestion that classified material is entitled to a
rebuttable presumption of secrecy.19
B. DEFIaTIONS AND CONCEPTS IN STATE SECRETS PROBLEMS
The sine qua non of the state secrets privilege is that the public
interest is served. In order to make an adequate judgment of the
propriety of granting the privilege in a given situation, a specific
knowledge of the concepts and definitions used by intelligence
officers and government officials in classifying information is
required.
There is a widespread belief that there are no true concepts
or definitions of state secrets. It is argued that statutes and execu-
tive orders do not provide specific meaningful guidelines for case
by case determination. "Basically, it is a problem generally
requiring case by case handling because the ultimate decision
depends upon many factors."20 This operational principle is
widely recognized by intelligence officers and is the fundamental
tenet of those who believe that only an experienced classification
expert can make a valid decision as to secrecy. From this it
logically follows that no judge can appreciate and duplicate the
expert's decision-making process.
Notwithstanding these beliefs, relatively rigid classifications
are suggested by Executive Order 10501:
(a) Top Secret. Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the
use of the classification Top Secret shall be authorized, by appropriate
authority, only for defense information or material which requires the
highest degree of protection. The Top Secret classification shall be
19. See Haydock, supra note 6, at 468. An extremely limited and con-
servative system for automatic declassification and downgrading of classi-
fication is found in a joint directive. Air Force Reg. 905--2, Army Reg.
380-6, OPNAV 5500.40B (Oct. 1, 1962). The system divides information
into four groups. The first two are exempt from automatic downgrading. The
third is downgraded at twelve year intervals and at the end of twenty-four
years is classified as confidential; there is no declassification. The fourth group
is downgraded every three years and, at the end of twelve years, is declassified.
20. Hearings 929.
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applied only to that information or material the defense aspect of which
is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in
exceptionally grave damage to the Nation such as leading to a definite
break in diplomatic relations affecting the defense of the United
States, an armed attack against the United States or its allies, a war,
or the compromise of military or defense plans, or intelligence opera-
tions, or scientific or technological developments vital to the national
defense.
(b) Secret. Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of
the classification Secret shall be authorized, by appropriate authority,
only for defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of
which could result in serious damage to the Nation, such as by
jeopardizing the international relations of the United States, endanger-
ing the effectiveness of a program or policy of vital importance to the
national defense, or compromising important military or defense plans,
scientific or technological developments important to national defense,
or information revealing important intelligence operations.
(c) Confidential. Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the
use of the classification Confidential shall be authorized, by appropri-
ate authority, only for defense information or material the unauthorized
disclosure of which could be prejudicial to the defense interests of the
Nation.2
This executive order, read as a whole, prescribes strict tests
for classification. Yet the phrase "defense information or ma-
terial the unauthorized disclosure of which could be prejudicial
to the interests of the Nation" invites administrative expansion
so as to include anything related to national defense. It would
appear that this invitation has been accepted22 despite the warn-
ing implicit in the order itself - "anything related to the national
defense" - is too broad a standard 3
Statutes dealing with state secrets also use very broad con-
cepts. Typical language is: "detrimental to the national se-
curity,"24 "undue risk to the common defense and security, '25
21. 18 Fed. Reg. 7049 (1953).
22. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 5200.1, pt. 2 (Dec. 31, 1964); Air
Force Reg. 205-1, §§ 1-10 (Nov. 1, 1963); OPNAV 5510.1C, §§ 0411-13
Navy Security Manual for Classified Information (April 26, 1965). The mili-
tary establishment is not completely insensitive to the value of free informa-
tion. OPNAV 5510.1C, §§ 0405-06 Navy Security Manual for Classified Infor-
mation (April 26, 1965). Yet the decision to classify is usually described as a
simple balancing between the need for secrecy and the cost, in terms of money
and red tape, of preserving secrecy. Air Force Reg. 205-1, §§ 1-11 (Nov. 1,
1963).
23. See statement of Professor (now Dean) Frank C. Newman, Hearing
534-35.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1964); 10 U.S.C. § 1582 (1964).
25. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 919, 940 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2169
(1964).
1966]
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"essential in the interest of national defense,"26 and "[publication
of a patent which would] be detrimental to the public safety or
defense or may assist the enemy or endanger the successful prose-
cution of the war."27 These standards tend to include all informa-
tion dealing with national defense. But arguably, phrases such
as "essential in the interest" and "undue risk" indicate there is
some national defense information which can be revealed. Such
statutes are not a great deal more illuminating than Executive
Order 10501 except that Congress tends to make separate pro-
visions for times of peace and times of war. 8
The courts have not developed meaningful standards for
evaluating state secrets under either statutes or executive orders.
Almost all cases follow the leading case, United States v.
Reynolds,2 and use conclusory phrases such as "military secrets,"
"strategic information," or "intelligence value" to describe priv-
ileged matter. The opinions do, however, recognize that legal
standards of state secrecy may vary, depending on whether the
nation is at peace or war.80
Two major concepts of state secrecy are condensed in the
phrases "strategic information" and "intelligence value." The
sentiments of many of those who use these phrases are summed
up in the United States Navy Security Manual:
The work of foreign intelligence agents is greatly simplified by the easy
collection of technical facts which appear in publications available to
the general public. From an intelligence standpoint, the time and effort
which foreign agents must spend to collect such information if it is not
made available to the public are very costly and subject the personnel
involved to being apprehended for violation of Federal laws. By com-
pelling foreign agents to expend time and money in the collection of
such information, their efforts on other projects are automatically cur-
tailed.sl
Using these concepts to determine the appropriateness of
secrecy is dangerous. The fact that free world intelligence agencies
must work very hard to obtain sought-after information while our
enemies can often achieve their objectives by subscribing to
26. 64 Stat. 824 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 1155 (1964).
27. 40 Stat. 420 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. 10 (i) (1964).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1964), 18 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1964).
29. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
S0. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); United States v. Haugen,
58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944).
31. OPNAV 5510.1C, § 1003 Navy Security Manual for Classified Infor-
mation (April 26, 1965).
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Aviation Week32 does not justify excessive secrecy. Such unequal
bargains are part of the price of living in a democracy. The de-
cision to keep something secret cannot be made by answering the
question, "would the Russians or Chinese classify it?"
The most recent attempt to categorize state secrets is found
in the Atomic Energy Act of 195 4 .a The act describes with some
degree of specificity the content of the special category "Re-
stricted Data": "The term "Restricted Data" means all data
concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic
weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the
use of special nuclear material in the production of energy. ' 4
It also explains the conflicting purposes which underlie prob-
lems of classification:
It shall be the policy of the Commission to control the dissemination
and declassification of Restricted Data in such a manner as to assure
the common defense and security. Consistent with such policy, the
Commission shall be guided by the following principles ....
(b) The dissemination of scientific and technical information relating
to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so as to provide
that free interchange of ideas and criticism which is essential to sci-
entific and industrial progress and public understanding and to enlarge
the fund of technical information.2 5
The statute strikes a compromise between the traditionally broad
standards articulated in most statutes and decisions and the con-
crete approach of the case by case method. Such a compromise
should produce reasonably clear rules designed to deal with sep-
arate problem areas. Formerly, the A.B.C. Manual contained
such rules,26 but the present A.E.C. Manual does not deal with
32. DuLrus, THE CRAFT OF INTELLIGENcE 239 (1963). President Eisenhower
stated that foreign systems spend large amounts to get such information
"... unless we give it to them for nothing. And since we don't get it for
nothing, I just don't believe in that kind of trade." N.Y. Times, April 28, 1955,
p. 8, col. 3.
83. 68 Stat. 919 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1964).
84. 68 Stat. 924 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w) (1964). See 68 Stat. 924
(1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2014(y) (1964), for a definition of "special nuclear ma-
terial" and 68 Stat. 940 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2162 (1964), which gives the
Atomic Energy Commission power to declassify "Restricted Data."
35. 68 Stat. 940 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2161 (1964).
86.
Insofar as control of information may affect progress:
a. With, respect to weapons - Retarding the progress of inimical
nations in these activities is to be regarded as generally more important
than advancing our own progress.
b. With respect to fissionable material -Retarding the progress of
1966]
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policies of classification. While in effect, the classification prac-
tices of the Atomic Energy Commission received relatively little
criticismS7
One of the principal tenets of this article is that the broad con-
cepts of the classic state secrets theory are of very limited value
when standing alone in court. "Injury to the United States"
and "advantage to a foreign nation" are the most workable con-
cepts, yet they too are manifestly vague and conclusory. A mere
statement to the effect that "disclosure would be detrimental to
the public interest" is not an adequate justification for nondis-
closure. While a classification of information system must ulti-
mately be based on the considered judgment of security officers
that divulgence will harm the national security, such judgments
are still made only after the consideration of many factors more
objective and concrete than the present statutory and judicial
standards.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to develop
complete and specific standards for the judicial classification of
state secrets, it is still clear that in the midsixties only information
related to a nation's capacity for attack and defense can justifi-
ably be kept secret. The specific areas of sensitive information
appear to be: (a) The plans and capabilities of specific combat
operations; (b) the official estimates of the military plans and
capabilities of potential enemy nations; (c) the existence, design,
and production of new weapons or equipment or the existence and
results of research programs specifically directed toward pro-
ducing new weapons and equipment; (d) the existence and nature
of special ways and means of organizing combat operations; (e)
inimical nations is not to be regarded as generally more important
than advancing our own progress.
c. With respect to the development of nuclear power-... Such
information [of only peripheral interest to weapons or to production of
fissionable materials] is likely to be of high value both to industry and
to progress in the atomic-energy program. In the field of atomic power,
therefore, to a greater extent than in that of the production of fissionable
material, the value to ourselves of dissemination of information acquires
an increased value as compared to the risk of disclosure to rivals.
d. With respect to nuclear and allied sciences-In order to pro-
mote scientific progress which requires a free interchange of ideas and of
criticisms, basic scientific information should not generally be classi-
fied ....
AToznc ENmIGY Coam~msioN MANUAL ch. 8404 (1959).
37. The lack of criticism may be due to the fact that the AEC may de-
classify but the military can still withhold the information. Air Force Reg.
205-IE (Jan. 5, 1966).
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the identity and location of vulnerable areas such as production
facilities, critical supply depots, or weapons installations; (f)
the existence and nature of clandestine intelligence operations,
special plans, or data; (g) the keys to communication codes; (h)
the existence and nature of international agreements relative to
military plans and capabilities and the exchange of intelligence.
The criterion used in determining when evidence should be
privileged is whether the interests of national security outweigh
the interests of fair litigation. The balancing must be made in as
specific a context as possible. That is, the decision should be made
with the knowledge of exactly what information or material is in
question and the purpose for which it is to be disclosed. The de-
cision maker should seek professional advice and use all the articu-
lated expertise of classification. Systematic categorization of prop-
erly classifiable material, such as mentioned above, is essential in
analyzing the national security interests in a given case. Yet the
mere fact that information is sensitive does not mean that it
must necessarily be kept secret. The value of military and diplo-
matic secrecy must be weighed against the general values of free
access to information and the general policy of refusing to with-
hold information from the courts without strong justification.
Those secrecy values which survive this balancing must then be
considered in light of (1) the comparative relevancy or materiality
of the evidence; (2) the litigant's need for the evidence; (3) the
effect on justice if the evidence is privileged. But even when
these delicate balancings are completed, the decision cannot be
made without knowing how much and to whom the sensitive
information will be disclosed. Only then can a proper decision be
made.
C. SECRETS AND THE COURTROOM
The most common complaint of the security conscious is that
thousands of details of defense programs are published in maga-
zines and congressional reports.38 By comparison, a particular
litigation would rarely disclose more than a small amount of
information. Such small amounts of information may, however,
be vital. A determination of the propriety of a privilege claimed
in litigation will be made by either the executive or the court.
If the executive makes the final decision, presumably he will do
so after privately examining the materials. If the court makes the
88. DuLLES, op. cit. supra note 82, at 2389.
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decision, its "examination must obviously be ex parte and in
camera if the privilege is not to be lost in its assertion.""9 The
only argument against this procedure seems to be that there are
some things which even a judge cannot be permitted to see. It is
strongly urged that such material is relatively rare; no reported
case has involved such material4 0 Since the most intimate and
shadowed operations of the nation are revealed in detail to Con-
gressmen and their staffs in executive session,4' it should be no
more dangerous, and probably less so, to make the same dis-
closure to a judge sitting in his chambers.
The claim that an ex parte, in camera hearing violates due
process is palpably without merit. Such a hearing is conducted to
aid judicial determination of a preliminary evidentiary question. 3
Presumably, the courts could establish, as they have in England,
an absolute privilege for government materials contingent only on
a proper claim of privilege by the executive. If the courts can do
this they can also condition a privilege on the approval of the
court sitting ex parte, in camera. As a practical matter, where
the claim of privilege is at least arguable the party opposing the
Government is faced with a choice of an ex parte, in camera hear-
ing as opposed to the possibility of no hearing at all. Thus, the
probability of objection to such a hearing is slim.
If there is a valid claim of privilege, or if the material in ques-
tion is very sensitive but not quite privileged, it may be possible
for the court to utilize the privileged evidence by receiving it in a
private hearing. This technique is approved for suits under the
39. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd,
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
40. Since it is a judicial function to construe the meaning of statutes pro-
hibiting the disclosure of information, a judicial order to the executive to
present information to the court constitutes, by implication, a holding that
disclosure to the court is not prohibited by statute.
41. DuLL s, op. cit. supra note 32, at 241.
42. If the government has any doubt as to the trustworthiness of a judge,
a change of docket could be requested. The lack of direct political pressure
on a judge should also be compared to that on a Congressman.
A Congressman is more likely than a judge to have political motives for
revealing or suggesting what he has learned in executive session. Congressional
hearings may turn into fishing expeditions as Congressmen do not have to
show good cause for discovery as does a private litigant.
43. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345
U.S. 1 (1953); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 25 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J.
1960); Snyder v United States, 20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v.
Certain Parcels of Land, 15 F.R.D. 224 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Royal Exchange
Assur. v. McGrath, 13 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Stratford Factors v. State
Banking Dep't, 10 App. Div. 2d 66, 197 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1960).
[Vol. 50:875
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Invention Secrecy Act4 4 and in British criminal cases under the
Official Secrets Act. 45 The in camera hearing is also used in cases
involving trade secrets.4 6 In such cases it is common to seal rec-
ords and exhibits and to impose heavy penalties if counsel or
parties do not respect secrecy orders. While rules 43 and 77 of the
Federal :Rules of Civil Procedure provide for open hearings, statu-
tory authority for closed hearings may be inferred from legislative
policy forbidding unwise or unnecessary revelation of secret
data. 7 Furthermore, while the sixth amendment guarantee of a
public trial seems to bar secret hearings in criminal cases, this
guarantee is not thought to be transgressed by a court's limiting
attendance at a trial concerning acts of moral turpitude.48 There
is, however, no direct authority on the relation of the sixth
amendment to the state secrets privilege. The problem of security
presented by the necessity of a jury raises the question whether
the members of the venire can be limited to good security risks.
Some hints on this issue might be found in cases approving blue
ribbon juries, but the answer is far from clear.49
Except for the well-established trade secrets procedures, use
of special courtroom techniques would be costly and clumsy.
Further, use of any of the techniques would substantially increase
the risk of disclosing secret or sensitive data to unauthorized
persons. The best practice would be to allow the use of special
techniques in cases involving sensitive information that is not
quite privileged. This would allow a more reasonable adjustment
to the need for secrecy and the needs of the litigation than is
possible under an all-or-nothing approach. It may also induce the
Government to permit the use of admittedly privileged evidence
when it is required in litigation. Lastly, it should ease the psycho-
logical strain on the judiciary when the question of privilege is
very close.
The suggestion that secondary evidence of the nonsecret ele-
ments of generally secret documents may be offered as an excep-
tion to the best evidence rule was contained in United States v.
44. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958). During World
War H, federal courts sitting in admiralty could hold secret hearings. See
Amendment to Rule 46, S16 U.S. 717 (1942), suspended, 328 U.S. 882 (1946).
45. 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 75, § 8(4) (1920).
46. Annot., 62 A.LR.2d 509 (1958).
47. E.g., 68 Stat. 940 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2161 (1964).
48. Reagan v. United States, 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1918). But see State
v. Schmit, 189 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1966). See generally 49 CoLIM1. L. REV.
110 (1949).
49. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 389 U.S. 261 (1947).
1966]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Haugen,50 a case involving secret Government contracts for the
establishment and maintenance of a plutonium plant. This course
was apparently followed at Haugen's second trial.5 ' The best
practice here would allow the Government to delete privileged
matter from a document under court supervision and then present
the opposing party with a copy of the document as deleted.5-
However, the Supreme Court in Reynolds was reluctant to use
this method when the private party requested copies of an Air
Force accident investigation report. The report contained non-
secret details of an airplane crash and details on tests of secret
electronic equipment. There was "nothing to suggest that the
electronic equipment had any causal connection with the acci-
dent. 53 The Supreme Court did not disapprove the deletion
method, but its conservative attitude toward this procedure indi-
cates that the availability of other special techniques in dealing
with privileged material is doubtful unless there is some express
or implied statutory authority approving them.
11. ROLE OF THE COURT
The scope of the courVs function in determining the validity of
a claim of privilege is the great issue of state secrets law.54 Since
the court must decide whether to sustain a claim of privilege in a
case before it, the real question is how much deference the court
will accord the executive 5
A. ENGLISH AND AmmcAN RUEs
The leading English case of Duncan v. (ammell, Laird &
Co.,56 held that the judge's function in state secrets cases is limited
to ascertaining whether the claim is made by the proper officer in
the proper form.5 7 In Duncan the widow of one of the ninety-
50. 58 F. Supp. 436, 439 (ED. Wash. 1944).
51. Haugen v. United States, 153 F2d 850 (9th Cir. 1946).
52. Machin v. Zuckert, 816 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 896; see Brief for Petitioner, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1
(1953).
53. 345 U.S. at 11.
54. 8 WIOMORE, EvmDE n § 2379 (McNaughtan rev. 1961).
55. McComrIcx, EviDEucE § 147 (1954).
56. [1942] A.C. 624. There are no other reported English state secrets
cases. All other English privilege cases deal with official information.
57. Thus overruling Robinson v. State of South Australia, [1931] A.C. 704
(P.C.). The rule in Duncan is now incorporated in a statute. Crown Proceed-
ing Act, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44, § 28 (1947).
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nine persons who died when the submarine Thetis failed to sur-
face during tests brought suit against the private builder of the
vessel. The Crown objected to the production of certain docu-
ments containing diagrams of the submarine on the grounds that
their production would injure the public interest. The court held
the claim of privilege by the First Lord of the Admiralty con-
clusive, though it expressly refrained from deciding whether this
would be true if the government itself were a party to the suit. 8
Confidence in the ability of the Crown Ministers to decide fairly
whether the privilege was legally justified did not prevent their
Lordships from exhorting the Ministers not to claim the privilege
on improper grounds.5 9 It is clear that although the British
courts will not challenge the executive's decision to withhold,
the executive is not lawfully entitled to decide as he pleases but
must apply a legal standard. In retrospect, the claimed privilege
in Duncan was probably justified since the documents revealed
that the torpedo tubes aboard the Thetis were capable of firing
sternwards, a novel development in 1942.P0
The American rule is not clear. The majority of federal courts
and most commentators feel the judge need not defer to a tech-
nically proper claim of executive privilege. The lack of clarity
is caused by the Supreme Court's holding in Reynolds1 In
Reynolds three civilian engineers were killed when an Air Force
bomber in which they were riding crashed during a mission test-
ing secret electronic equipment. Their widows filed suit under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. The plaintiffs moved under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 for production of the Air
58. [1942] A.C. 624, 632-33.
59.
It would not be a good ground that, if they were produced, the con-
sequences might involve the department or the government in parlia-
mentary discussion or in public criticism, or might necessitate the
attendance as witnesses or otherwise of officials who have pressing
duties elsewhere. Neither would it be a good ground that production
might tend to expose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend
to lay the department open to claims for compensation. In a word, it
is not enough that the minister of the department does not want to
have the documents produced.
Id. at 642 (Simon, L.C.).
60. Simon, Evidence Excluded by Considerations of State Interest, 1955
CmuB. LJ. 62, 74.
61. Apparently, the Scottish procedure is similar to that recommended in
Reynolds but there is no reported experience with it.
62. Fmn. R. Civ. P. 34. This rule provides for the discovery and production
of documents and things in custody of a party to a suit, upon motion and
showing of good cause.
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Force's official accident investigation report and the statements
of the three surviving crew members taken during the investiga-
tion. The district court found good cause and ordered production
over a general claim of executive privilege." The Secretary of the
Air Force then formally claimed the state secrets privilege. Pro-
duction of the documents was ordered to allow the court to
determine properly the validity of the claims. When the Govern-
ment refused to comply, the court entered an order that the
facts on the issue of negligence would be considered as established
in plaintiffs' favor. The Third Circuit affirmed,6  answering the
contention of the Secretary of the Air Force that he should be
the final determinor of whether the claimed privilege was justified
by saying:
[A] claim of privilege against disclosing evidence relevant to the issues
in a pending law suit involves a justiciable question, traditionally with-
in the competence of the courts, which is to be determined in accord-
ance with the appropriate rule of evidence, upon the submission of the
documents in question to the judge for his examination in camera.95
The Supreme Court reversed,6 agreeing that the courts should
independently decide the validity of claims of privilege,6 T but
holding that in camera examination would not be necessary when
the Government can "satisfy the court, from all the circumstances
of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of
the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest
of national security, should not be divulged.... .,s7a The Court said
its rule in state secret cases was:
In each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how
far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for
invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a strong showing
of necessity, the claim of privilege should not 'be lightly accepted, but
even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of
privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at
stake.68
63. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aj'd sub
im., Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345
U.S. 1 (1953).
64. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (sd Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345
U.S. 1 (1953).
65. 192 F.ad at 997.
66. Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented, substantially for
the reasons stated in the opinion of Judge Maris. 845 U.S. at 12.
67. Id. at 8.
67a. Id. at 10.
68. Id. at 11.
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In deciding the merits of the case the Court took judicial notice
of the effects of the Cold War on our defense posture, thus con-
firming the principle that the extent of the privilege should vary
with wartime necessity. It then held that the record revealed a
reasonable likelihood that the accident report would contain
references to secret electronic equipment. Further, the Court
thought the showing of need was doubtful in view of the Govern-
ment's offer to produce the surviving crew members for deposition.
The principal difficulty with the Reynolds rule is that it forces
the judge to rule in a vacuum. He must determine necessity
without knowing the contents of the requested document and
their value to the requesting party. In Reynolds the accident
investigation report may have contained nothing of value to
plaintiff. But it might have contained evidence of the Govern-
ment's negligence not otherwise obtainable. Thus, if the report
contained information not obtainable from the surviving crew
members, the opportunity to depose them would not reduce the
need for the report. Yet the Reynolds rule requires deciding these
and similar questions without looking at the reports or documents.
Since the judge is adrift in a sea of unknowns, it is hard to imagine
a case in which the Government cannot plausibly argue that mili-
tary secrets are at stake. 9
In Reynolds the Court sought a middle ground between Dun-
can and the opinion of the court of appeals. It would seem,
however, that there is no middle ground and that the Reynolds
compromise is illusory. In the final analysis, if the court does not
examine the information, it must decide in the dark.o Thus, the
executive will almost always determine the legal question of priv-
ilege. For all practical purposes the rules of Reynolds and Duncan
are identical. The significant fact, however, is not the equation
of Reynolds with Duncan, but rather the inability of the Court
to find a meaningful middle ground. The issue of whether the
court should make an independent examination of the material
in question or simply accept the executive's sworn assertion of
the privilege, remains unresolved. The remainder of this section
is devoted to resolving this issue.
69. See the ,bow and arrow incident, text accompanying note 90 infra.
70. The court may also hear the testimony of the officer who determines
whether material is privileged. It is doubted that such testimony could be
specific enough to give the court adequate guidance for its decision without
being so specific as to amount to a revelation of the supposedly privileged
information.
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B. MUST THE COURT RELY ON THE GOVERNI ENT'S CLAIM OF
PMVILEGE?
It would seem that the executive could not properly claim the
exclusive legal power to decide questions of the state secrets
privilege. The privilege was judicially created, and it is foolish to
assert that the judiciary is without power to supervise its exercise.
Problems of executive versus judicial power do arise over execu-
tive privilege. Congress and the President have debated this
matter for many years without judicial interference. The execu-
tive privilege is founded on the separation of powers. The execu-
tive asserts its freedom to decide which materials it shall disclose
and to whom it shall disclose them. This privilege is not based on
the nature of the material withheld, since it need only be con-
nected with the executive's constitutional duties, but upon the
executive's personal right to determine when withholding is in
the public interest 1
The state secrets privilege may be distinguished in that it is
defined solely by reference to the privileged material. An ex-
panded executive privilege could displace the state secrets
privilege; 2 but this possibility is not the immediate concern of this'
paper.
71. There axe statutes requiring the executive and the administrative
agencies to disclose information. The overwhelming majority of such statutes
pertain to operations which Congress has commanded the executive to per-
form. Insofar as Congress authors specific projects, it is not difficult to con-
tend they may disclose the results as they see fit. See generally House Comm.
on Gov't Operations, Availability of Information from Federal Departments
and Agencies, H.R. Inrs: No. 2084, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); No. 1224,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); No. 1137, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959); No. 234,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); No. 2578, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); No. 1884,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); No. 1619, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); No. 157,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); No. 2947, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956); STAFF oF
THE SPECAL SUBCOMsiM. ON Gov'T INFORMATION OF THE HOUSE CoNMI. ON
Gov'T OPERATIONS, 86TH CONG., 2d SEss., FEDERmAL STATuTES ON nm AV mA-
BILITY OF INFOnmATION (Comm. Print 1960); Hearing Before the Subcommittee
of Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess., 2 pts. (Comm. Print 1958).
72. The executive privilege theory has its antecedents in the English doc-
trine that the King is immune from judicial process. See Street, State Secrets
-A Comparative Study, 14 MODERN L. Rxv. 121 (1951). The theory that the
President is like the King in this respect was rejected by Chief Justice Marshall
in United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 80, 34 (No. 14692d) (C.C. Va. 1807).
For a discussion of the Constitutional basis of this privilege, see Bishop, The
Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YA.E
LJ. 477 (1957).
No court has ever compelled the chief executive to furnish information in
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When the Government is a party to litigation involving state
secrets the separation of powers argument works against the
executive, for it is normally a judicial function to determine the
existence of a privilege. Giving the executive the final word in
determining the existence of a privilege would infringe this tra-
ditionally judicial function. Writing for the court of appeals in
Reynolds, Judge Maris said:
to hold that the head of an executive department of the Government
in a suit to which the United States is a party may conclusively deter-
mine the Government's claim of privilege is to abdicate the judicial
function and permit the executive branch of the Government to in-
fringe the independent province of the judiciary as laid down by the
Constitution. 3
Further, when the Government as a party resists a court order,
the court can enter judgment against it or find against it on
specific issues. Admittedly, assessing penalties is not the same as
rationally deciding the question of privilege, yet the fact that a
court may penalize the Government justifies the view that the
court has the power to rule on the privilege question.
The greatest problems in this area arise when the Government
is a disinterested third party. The executive may intervene to
assert the privilege when a private party having possession of
secret documents cannot claim the privilege.74 Or, as a third
party, the Government may find itself called upon to surrender
documents it considers secret.75 In such cases the executive is
a judicial proceeding. The only two decisions on the point have based their
holdings on the doctrine of separation of powers. Thompson v. German Valley
R.R., 22 N.J. Eq. 111 (Ch. 1871); Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. 488 (1877). One
federal court has held there is no absolute executive privilege. Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 88 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ohio 1964). See also United
States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524 (D. Colo. 1964).
It is generally conceded that there is an executive privilege, but it is
thought to belong only to the President himself. H.R. REP. No. 2947, 81th
Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1956). Wigmore contends that the privilege applies only to
the requirement of attendance at judicial proceedings and does not apply to
the furnishing of information. 8 WiGMolE, op. cit. nspra note 54, §§ 2869, 2370.
The principal executive documents supporting the existence of the privilege
are 40 Ors. Arr'Y GEN. 45 (1941) (Robert H. Jackson); 25 Ops. AT'r GN. 326
(1905).
73. 192 F.2d at 997.
74. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624.
75. Cf. Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
896 (1963). Presently pending in the federal district court in Baltimore, Mary-
land, is a slander suit by one Estonian emigr6 against another. The defendant
admitted spreading rumors that plaintiff was a Soviet agent, but claimed
he did so as an agent of the C.I.A. The C.I.A. filed an affidavit affirming this
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usually successful, partly because its noninvolvement lends force
to its claim of having objectively determined whether the material
should be privileged. The executive, however, actually may be
withholding evidence for reasons of cost and convenience.76 Addi-
tionally, the executive has a bureaucratic tendency to overvalue
its privacy. It is doubtful, therefore, that the court should give
great weight to a claim of privilege merely because the Govern-
ment is disinterested in the litigation. In fact, the primary reason
for judicial deference to the executive's assertions of privilege in
this area well may be judicial uncertainty as to its ability to com-
pel the executive to comply with its rulings. Although the court
may order discovery and allow a subpoena to be issued against
the Government to aid in litigation between private parties, there
is serious doubt about its power to demand compliance with such
orders.Y Executive disobedience of a subpoena simply cannot
result, as a practical matter, in a contempt order.7
The courts might try to coerce disclosure when the Govern-
ment is a third party by threatening to prevent the Government
from using the courts as a civil plaintiff in its proprietary role until
it complies with the discovery subpoena. It should be noted that
there is no precedent for this attempted judicial attainder. If
legally possible it still probably would be as impractical as the
contempt order and considerably more harmful to the public
interest. A more realistic sanction would be to deny use of the
discovery procedure to the Government when it vigorously resists
discovery against itself. This action would not require particularly
novel theories for support 7 9 Perhaps the familiar, and slightly
claim. At pre-trial proceedings the defendant refused to reveal details of his
C.I.A. job. On the basis of Admiral Raborn's affidavit that he had forbade
defendant to disclose any such information the court recognized defendant's
privilege. The case could present the interesting question of privilege if the
defense of truth is raised but the present immunity of government agents from
slander actions makes this a moot point. See Barr v. Mateo, 860 U.S. 564
(1959). Chicago Daily News, May 4, 1966, p. 14, col. 6-7.
76. See Bowles v. Ackerman, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). The military
has directed that information is not to be withheld merely because it exposes
administrative inefficiency. E.g., OPNAV 5510.1C, § 0406 Navy Security
Manual for Classified Information (April 26, 1965).
77. Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
896, appeal after remand, 336 F.2d 914 (1964). There is no exemption of the
United States from the discovery and deposition portions of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Berger & Xrash, Government Immunity From Di -
covery, 59 YALEn LJ. 1451, 1454-55 (1950).
78. See, e.g., the friction between Acting Attorney General Katzenbach and
District Judge Cox reported in Time, Nov. 6, 1964, pp. 44, 49.
79. The obverse of this suggested policy was described in Judge Yankwich's
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fatuous, criminal law maxim of balancing the inherent inequities
involved in a suit between the powerful Government and a simple
private citizen would serve. The recent expansion of permissible
discovery against the Government may indicate the availability
of methods by which the courts may control an uncooperative
Government.
If the court is convinced that the claim of privilege is without
merit, at the least it ought to be able to invoke the English pro-
cedure under Duncan. That is, the judge would call upon the
department head to appear in court and make a sworn claim of
privilege, or would insist that the head personally examine the
relevant documents in chambers. This procedure borders on the
ridiculous, but it would be difficult for the executive to challenge
its adoption since it has often urged the English rule upon the
courts.8 0 The advantage of the practice is that it creates a pro-
cedural barrier to incessant assertion of the privilege yet does not
challenge the executive's right to withhold. Such a procedure may
result in the executive dropping all but the most well-taken claims
of privilege.
There are other pressures on the executive to comply with a
subpoena from an insistent court. The executive has had a running
battle with the courts and Congress over its right to withhold
information. An open conflict on the matter would, at the very
least, impair the executive's claimed right to withhold, and the
courts likely would be backed to the hilt by Congress. The courts
have always held, in principle, that they alone are to determine
privileges; they have never held that cabinet officers are immune
from process and contempt. Second, a determined court, as inter-
familiar statement:
In all these cases, particularly in those seeking injunctive relief, the
Government expects the utmost cooperation of the defendants or even
prospective defendants in placing their files and records, ranging over
periods of years, at the disposal of its agents. When the objection is
encountered, the widest use is made of the process of the courts. A
justified criticism of the Government is, however, that it is not so
generous in reciprocating. Thus, the Government stands on the liberal
rules which allow them to plead the facts generally and resists at all
stages, every attempt to compel them, through -bills of particulars to
supply data which would give the defendants a definite idea of the
line of attack which they may expect at the trial. Judges, in our
circuit, including myself, have been rather generous in compelling
disclosure, so as to channel the inquiry.
Yankwich, Observations on. Anti-Trust Procedures, 10 F.R.D. 165, 168 (1950).
80. Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 38-42, United States v. Reynolds, 845 U.S.
1 (1953). Of. Fowler v. Wirtz, 84 F.R.D. 20 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
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preter of the Constitution and final arbiter of virtually all con-
flicts between branches of the Government, has the political power
to insist that it make an independent ruling even when the Gov-
ermnent is a disinterested third party. It is quite probable that
if the courts are firm the evidence will be forthcoming.8'
Congress' involvement with the state secrets privilege is fairly
clear. As final arbiter of military and diplomatic policy, 2 Con-
gress has the power to create, obliterate, or waive the state secrets
privilege, subject only to constitutional limitations. The argument
that Congress cannot waive the executive's privilege for him
seems persuasive because the executive privilege is tantamount to
a "personal" privilege pertaining to material in its possession. The
state secrets privilege, however, is nonpersonal, applicable to
specified information regardless of who has possession of it, and
justified by policies of national security which are ultimately
determined by Congress. If Congress has the last word on the
policies which justify the privilege, it should also have the final
say on its exercise.
It is probable that the individual states can never claim the
state secrets privilege. The conduct of war and foreign relations
belongs exclusively to the federal government.s The state
secrets privilege is justified only in terms of national interests.
This does not mean that a state may not have state secrets in its
possession; it means only that those materials are privileged in
the nation's interest and not in the state's.
State courts rarely deal with assertions of the privilege; they
have no legal power to challenge claims of privilege made by the
federal government, or to address orders to federal officials.
Occasionally, however, in a suit between private parties in a state
court one party will refuse to reveal material because it may be a
state secret. The best procedure seems to be that followed in
Ticon Corp. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp.,"s where a
81. Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
896 (1963).
8.2. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, § 8, 11, § 2. The presidential powers over
treaties and the armed forces are subject either to outright congressional veto
or to implied veto by virtue of Congress' control over appointments and
appropriations. Cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 28-30 (1965) (dissenting
opinion). But cf. Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905, 910 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 918 (1959); Frank v. Herter, 269 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 918 (1959).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. It is inconceivable that the contingency in
§ 10, which would permit a State to engage in war, would come to pass today.
84. 206 Misc. 727, 134 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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subcontractor sued the prime contractor for breach of contracts
labeled "confidential" by the Army. The prime contractor moved
to dismiss on the grounds that the conduct of its defense would
violate the federal espionage laws. The court denied the motion to
dismiss, holding that it was under a duty to protect both secrecy
and justice. The court stated it would retain jurisdiction, using
all proper judicial techniques to keep state secrets unrevealed,
unless dismissal was essential to protect the national defense. The
court decided to proceed according to its own best judgment until
such time as the federal government chose to intervene.
C. SHOULD TEM COURT D=R TO Tm GovERNMNT's
CLA-M OF PRIVUGE?
There are five basic reasons why the executive's claim of the
state secrets privilege should be conclusive: (1) Only an experi-
enced intelligence officer can determine properly whether certain
material should be kept secret; (2) even when the Government is
a party to litigation, its officers do not have a personal interest in
the litigation; on the contrary, they have a duty to be fair and
can be trusted to weigh correctly litigation interests and apply the
same standards as would the court; (3) the judiciary may well be
biased in favor of the needs of the particular litigation; (4) some
secrets cannot be entrusted even to judges; (5) if a department
or agency head is required to personally claim the privilege, the
possibility that the privilege will be invoked by a faceless sub-
ordinate hidden in the administrative establishment is eliminated.
There are, of course, reasons on the other side for insisting that
the courts themselves make the determination: (1) The courts,
which deal with equally complex problems of patent and antitrust
law, can make reasonable decisions on questions of state secrets
when aided by appropriate intelligence experts; (2) the executive
may be biased in favor of the needs of secrecy; (3) allowing a
litigant to determine his own legal rights during the course of
litigation violates notions of fair play; (4) judicial decisions, unlike
those of the executive, are subject to review; (5) agency and
department heads will not have the time to personally claim the
privilege. The additional fact that expert classifiers of data are
usually subordinates makes delegation of the decision to claim the
privilege inevitable.
It has been suggested that many problems might be solved by
creating under article I of the Constitution a special tribunal
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to pass upon questions of the state secrets privilege.8 ' This tri-
bunal would consist of experts in the area of national security
making decisions with due regard for litigants' needs. If such a
tribunal dealt solely with state secrets, it would not have enough
to do to justify its existence. However, Congress could create
sufficient work for the tribunal by granting it authority to arbi-
trate newspaper, industrial, academic, and legislative demands
for information from the executive. However, considering the
inevitable executive opposition to a dual function agency and the
small amount of work available for a tribunal dealing only with
legal questions of state secrecy, it will be assumed that a special
board is not likely to be established.
Neither the executive nor the courts have been outstanding
in dealing with problems of state secrets. The executive has re-
fused, under Executive Order 10501, to disclose (a) the number
and use of administrative aircraft to a member of Congress;,6
(b) the picture of the interior of a plush transport plane to a
member of Congress;8 7 (c) information on monkey research to the
press (on the grounds of possible sensitivity of Indian suppliers
of monkeys to their use in space research) ;88 (d) photographs of
the B-58 and the Titan missile to the press even though both
were in public view;8 (e) a report on a bow and arrow weapon
developed during World War 11 to the scientist who developed
the weapon when he requested it some years after the war;90 (f)
a report on pollution of ground supply water adjoining an arsenal
(which also reported that water runs downhill) to a member of
Congress; 1 (g) reports dating back to 1907 of attacks by sharks
on seamen to a group of scientists. 2
The situation would not be so absurd if such restrictions were
promptly lifted when called to the attention of the department
head or when a court order compelled a reexamination of the
material. Unfortunately, however, prompt reclassification does
85. Haydock, Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Se-
curity Requirements, 61 HAnv. L. REv. 468 (1948); Sanford, Evidentiary Privi-
leges Against the Production of Data Within the Control of Executive Depart-
ments, 3 V-4-m. L. REv. 73 (1949).
86. H.R. RnP. No. 2578, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1958).
87. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-05 (1958).
88. H.R. REP. No. 1187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1959).
89. Id. at 209; H. R. REP. No. 1881, supra note 87, at 57.
90. H.R. RE. No. 1619, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1958); HR. REP. No.
1884, supra note 87, at 10.
91. H.R. REP. No. 2084, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1960).
92. H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 87, at 125.
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not generally occur. Even the parade of horrors listed above in-
volved information that was not disclosed until the pressure of
a full-scale congressional investigation was exerted, and even then
there were often months of delay.
The courts, for their part, have been quite as marvelous as
the executive. In Totten v. United States,9 3 the Supreme Court
declared that a contract for Civil War espionage services made
by President Lincoln in July of 1861, was still a state secret in
1875.04 In Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,95 draw-
ings of armor piercing projectiles were expunged from the record
in a patent infringement suit. This shutting of the barn doors after
the horse had fled served no useful purpose and deprived a litigant
of needed evidence. In Mercer v. Denne,9 6 an English judge sug-
gested that maps of the English coastline made in 1641, 1644, and
1647 for the Admiralty might be privileged in 1904. In Reynolds
the Court disapproved a procedure that would have disclosed de-
tails of electronic equipment to only one man, the chief judge of a
federal district court.
The executive has made the state secrets problem worse than it
need be by retaining unnecessary classifications on billions of
items0 7 While it would seem to be fair to assume that a court
order would at least induce the executive to reexamine the with-
holding of information in light of the limited courtroom disclosure
contemplated,9 this has not been the case, in part because the
judicial record has been one of great deference to the executive 9
In Republic of China v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.,' the
coplaintiffs, Nationalist China and the United States, were suing
an insurer to recover for the loss of seven ships. The crews of
these ships had defected to Red China, leaving the ships in the
British harbors of Singapore and Hong Kong. In spite of diplo-
matic negotiations, the British eventually allowed the Red
93. 92 U.S. 105 (1875). Totten was followed in Tucker v. United States,
118 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
94. Allen Dulles, a practicing lawyer as well as an intelligence officer, has
said of this case: "This is a warning to the agent that he had better get his
money on the barrelhead at the time of his operation." DuaLEs, THE CRAFT
OF INTELLIGENCE 36 (1963).
95. 199 Fed. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912).
96. [1905] 2 Ch. 538.
97. Dep't of Defense Directive No. 5210.6 (Dec. 6, 1953); Hearings
1764-79, 8448-49.
98. See Air Force Reg. 110-5 (Dec. 20, 1960).
99. Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE LJ. 879
(1962).
100. 142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1956).
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Chinese to take the ships. The United States was obliged under
a clause of the insurance policy to attempt to recover the ships.
Privilege was claimed for the records of the diplomatic conversa-
tions which were material to this issue. The court held, without
examining the records, that the strained relations between Britain
and the United States over the recognition of Red China justified
the recognition of the privilege. The American diplomats might
have made just a token effort to recover the ships, solely in order
to make out a case for recovery under the insurance. By there-
after claiming privilege, such conduct is promoted to the status
of a state secret.
On the whole it is probably better for the court to determine
independently the validity of claims of the state secrets privilege.
The courts have clearly shown they are not about to run wild in
declaring information unprivileged. Seemingly there are few cases
in which data are so secret with its value so subtle that a judge
could not be trusted to make a reasoned decision. Indeed, lay
classifiers tend to overclassify information, and an independent de-
termination will force the executive to reason out his claim of
privilege with the likely result that incidents of unreasonable
claims will diminish. The aura of executive fiat in state secrets
cases should also be expected to disappear.
Independent judicial determination should also eliminate in-
stances where the executive, believing itself justified by executive
privilege, will claim the state secrets privilege to avoid relying
on the more tenuous legal doctrine of executive privilege. No one
reading the briefs and record in Reynolds can doubt that the
Government sought primarily to protect the confidential nature
of accident investigation reports. The Government's briefs laid
heavy emphasis on the proposition that if investigation reports
were not kept secret, administrative investigations of air acci-
dents would become less efficient because witnesses might be
reluctant to make nonconfidential statements. The Government's
argument is not unreasonable. But it is hardly an argument
grounded on considerations of national security sufficient to justify
the state secrets privilege. Further, the history of Revised Statute
161... illustrates the Government's propensity to use inapposite
authority to support policies justified on other grounds. The
101. REV. STAT. § 161 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). Pending
legislation, amending 5 U.S.C. 22, specifically provides for de novo judicial
determination whether information is properly withheld. Such cases are given
preference on the docket. The burden is on the Government. The penalty
for Government noncompliance is, perhaps unfortunately, punishment for
contempt. See H.R. 5012, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); see also H.R. 14735,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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statute provided: "The head of each department is authorized to
prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for ... the custody,
use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property ap-
pertaining to it." This statute was claimed as authority for with-
holding information by the Department of Defense,10 and was so
used by several other agencies 10 3 despite persuasive evidence that
it was meant only to operate as a "housekeeping" statute. 04 When
Congress sought to amend the statute, the executive opposed the
action. In 1958 the statute was amended by adding the following
sentence: "This section does not authorize withholding informa-
tion from the public or limiting the availability of records to the
public."' 105 The executive's reaction to this amendment is revealed
by President Eisenhower's statement upon signing the amend-
ment:
It is also clear from the legislative history of the bill that it is not in-
tended to, and indeed could not, alter the existing power of the head
of an Executive department to keep appropriate information or papers
confidential in the public interest. This power in the Executive Branch
is inherent under the Constitution. 0 6
The inference seems inescapable that the executive has systemati-
cally sought to sustain honest decisions with a dubious legal
justification and will undoubtedly attempt to continue to do so.
If there is an executive privilege or broad ranging privileges for
official information - or if there should be - then appropriate
rulings by court or statute ought to be secured by the executive.
The executive should not employ, and thus distort, the state
secrets privilege in an effort to support other claims of privilege.
An independent determination by the court of the state secrets
privilege should terminate this practice.
In the last analysis, very little is lost if the court makes an
independent determination. Limited disclosure to the judge will
102. Tim SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTE oN Gov NZXENT INFORMATION, HOUSE
-Comm. ow Gov'T OPERATIONS, 81TH CONG., 1sT SEss., REPLIEs FROM FEDERAL
AGENCIES TO QUESTIONNAIE 119-20 (Comm. Print 1955).
103. United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 840 U.S. 462 (1951); Jackson
v. Allen Indus., Inc., 250 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1958); Appeal of the SEC, 226
F.2d 501, 517 (6th Cir. 1955).
104. Berger & Krash, supra note 77 at 1460-61; Mitchell, Govervnient
Secrecy in Theory and Practice: "Rules and Regulations" as an Autonomous
Screen, 58 CoLIJm. L. REv. 199 (1958).
105. 72 Stat. 547 (1958), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
106. PUBLIC PAPERS OF =m PRESmENTS OF Tm UNITED STATES, DwIGHT
Ai. BisnowEx 601 (1958). Professor Bernard Schwartz has said of the infor-
mation withholding practices of federal departments and agencies, "You notice
they try to hang their coat on every little statute they can find. They try to
say, that gives us authority." Hearings 509.
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reduce the loss of secrecy. If the executive is as careful in claiming
the privilege as it maintains, it will win in the overwhelming num-
ber of cases. In those in which the privilege is denied there should
be an immediate appeal. In those cases where the Government
is a party and cannot sustain its position, the executive can with-
draw the secret material and accept an adverse decision.
While very little is lost by an independent judicial determina-
tion of the privilege, a great deal is gained in terms of a fair and
efficient legal system. If the privilege is sustained, the deprived
party is at least assured that his plight was caused by an over-
riding public interest in national security and not solely by execu-
tive fiat. If the privilege is denied, full disclosure of information
obviously aids the achievement of maximum fairness in litigation.
Whenever the Government asserts a privilege, it has the bur-
den of persuasion. Arguably, this should not be the case when
national security is involved since the special interests are im-
portant enough to require exceptional procedural protection. This
argument, however, makes little sense in the context of the
ex parte hearing and thus the burden should remain with the
Government. The most reasonable concession that interests of
national security justify was the one made in Reynolds - the
party requesting the information had a heavy burden of showing
need for the evidence.1 7 This burden is reasonable only if the
party may be compelled to show that it cannot establish its con-
tentions with other evidence. Surely a party cannot be required
to show that he needs a specific piece of evidence if he does not
know its contents. Only when the Government is willing to allow
opposing counsel to examine the evidence is it tenable that the
requesting party should have the burden of persuading the court
that the particular evidence is not privileged.
A claim of privilege should be more substantial and definite
than the typical statement that the executive finds that the
disclosure of such and such a document would be detrimental to
the national security.'18 Each claim of privilege should be ac-
companied by a statement of reasons supporting nondisclosure
which need not be made public. To accept anything less is to
accept the executive's determination of the existence of privilege
as conclusive. The principles of decision making described in
Part I of this article, plus the present conclusion that the court
should make decisions on the merits of the privilege, require the
107. 345 U.S. at 11.
108. See the comments of Judge Clark concurring in Bank Line, Ltd. v.
United States, 163 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1947).
STATE SECRETS
judge to examine the documents and the executive's statements
of reasons before ruling on the privilege. But, in the face of
Reynolds, the most that can be urged under present law is that
the court demand a specific explanation of why the evidence must
be privileged. Under Reynolds, however, even this procedure may
not allow an explanation sufficiently specific to aid the judge in
making his ruling. How much information the court can demand
without subverting Reynolds is problematical.
I. THE PRIVILEGE IN SPECIFIC TYPES OF
LITIGATION
As a general rule, the nature of governmental privileges varies
with the type of the litigation and the Government's role in it.
This section will discuss the degree to which this is true of the
state secrets privilege.
A. THE PRVLEGE IN CRnmmAL CAs~s
In criminal cases the Government as prosecutor is often
thought to be under a duty to produce all relevant evidence or
suffer dismissal. 0 9 The language of Judge Learned Hand in United
States v. Andolschek,110 a bribery case in which the court ordered
production of reports made by defendant to his superior supports
this thesis:
While we must accept it as lawful for a department of the government
to suppress documents, even when they will help determine con-
troversies between third persons, we cannot agree that this should
include their suppression in a criminal prosecution, founded upon those
very dealings to which the documents relate, and whose criminality
they will, or may, tend to exculpate. So far as they directly touch the
criminal dealings, the prosecution necessarily ends any confidential
character the documents may possess; it must be conducted in the open,
and will lay bare their subject matter. The government must choose;
either it must leave the transactions in the obscurity from which a trial
will draw them, or it must expose them fully.1 '
Nevertheless, the courts have never held that the state secrets
109. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 61 (1957); Christoffel v. United
States, 200 F.2d 734, 738-39 (D.C. Cir. 1952); United States v. Grayson, 166
F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584
(2d Cir. 1946); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944).
The court may examine the evidence ex parte, in camera to pass upon its
relevancy. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959); United States v.
Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
110. 142 F.2d 503.
111. Id. at 506.
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privilege cannot be properly invoked in a criminal prosecution.
All of the cases which hold that the Government cannot avail
itself of a privilege in criminal prosecutions have dealt with official
information or informer privileges. Should a privileged state
secret be learned by the defendant, the judge might not allow
the evidence to be introduced in open court;1 2 if the information
was gained through the Government's carelessness or deliberate
action, the privilege would probably be deemed waived.
The Government's position was sustained in the only reported
criminal case in which the state secrets privilege was claimed,
United States v. Haugen."3 There a World War II contract pro-
vided that a subcontracting commissary company furnish meals
to the workers of the prime contractors at a large Government
plutonium plant. In a prosecution for forging meal tickets, the
contract was held to be a state secret. The judicial temper is
sympathetic to claims of privilege based on national security
during wartime, and Haugen was explicitly grounded on the
existing state of war. A more recent case, United States v.
Schneiderman,"4 involved reports by a prosecution witness to the
FBI. The court held the defendant was not entitled to this official
information as a matter of right, although it was presumably
relevant. Considering these cases, it is impossible to state with
precision the current status of the state secrets privilege in crimi-
nal prosecutions." 5
It seems sensible that in criminal cases, the privilege should
only be claimed when the evidence does not directly touch the
criminal dealings. The rule follows Andolschek, and is probably
consistent with Haugen. Admittedly it is a vague rule, but it
probably cannot be improved. Where the evidence bears on facts
112. If the defendant acquired the secret information through his own
wrongdoing, the court might not allow the evidence to be introduced in open
court and rely on the threat of prosecution for unauthorized disclosure to keep
the defendant silent. If the defendant is faced with serious criminal charges
and the secret evidence is exculpatory, it will certainly be revealed at least
to the press.
113. 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944).
114. 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
115. The sensational Sokolev espionage case might have posed an interest-
ing problem. The N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1964, p. 1, col. 3, reported that the
government had dropped the case to avoid revealing its informer apparatus
under 18 U.S.C. § 34S2 (1964), which requires a list of proposed government
witnesses and their plices of abode to be given to the defendant in capital
cases. Though the problems here seem to involve official information and
informer privileges, it is strongly urged that revelation of an informer apparatus
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which are relevant to guilt or innocence, however, the Government
should not be able both to claim its privilege and proceed with
the prosecution. Reynolds indicates this is the direction in which
the courts are moving.110
Most criminal cases involving state secret claims arise under
the espionage laws1 17 which make the taking or disclosing of in-
formation relating to the national security a criminal offense.118
The Supreme Court held in Gorin v. United States,'1 9 that a jury
must determine whether the material in question relates to the
national defense. This holding may force the Government to drop
a prosecution to avoid aggravating the original breach of se-
curity. 20 However, the problem does not arise in prosecutions
under the Atomic Energy Act which punishes the communica-
tion or disclosure of restricted data whatever its content, nor does
it arise in prosecutions for communicating or disclosing diplomatic
codes" ' or classified information concerning communications in-
telligence such as codes, ciphers, or cryptographic systems."3
However, problems in administration of the espionage laws,
though related to problems of privilege, do not actually involve
the state secrets privilege. The necessity to disclose information
at trial which is thought to be vital to the interests of national
security arises because the legislative definitions of the elements
of the crime require exposure of state secrets to the jury. Presum-
ably the legislature could rewrite the espionage laws to avoid the
disclosure problems; such redrafting would not involve the ques-
tion of privilege except insofar as the legislative policy, like that
underlying the Atomic Energy Act or the British Official Secrets
in an espionage case involves revelation of stae secrets. The incident is not
informative because the facts are not clear and the presence of the statute
foreclosed litigation on the privilege.
116. In dictum, Chief Justice Vinson stated:
The rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which
prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is
unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke
its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which
might be material to his defense.
345 U.S. at 12.
117. Note, 47 COLUxr. L. REv. 1356 (1947).
118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1964).
119. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
120. United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 920 (1950).
121. 68 Stat. 958, 959 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2274, 2277 (1964).
122. 18 US.C. § 952 (1964).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1964).
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Act,'124 regards all classified Government information as privi-
leged.
B. THE PIvLEGEm IN CIVI CASES WHEN THE
GoVERNENT Is THE PLAINm
There is authority for the proposition that the Government
waives its privileges by bringing a civil suit. 5 However, the state
secrets privilege was recognized in Republic, of China v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co.,126 the only case in which the United States
as a plaintiff claimed the privilege. If the Government brings a
suit in its proprietary role, it clearly may claim the privilege.'2 7
But when suits are brought in the Government's law enforcement
capacity, such as antitrust actions, the courts have often em-
ployed a waiver theory to defeat the claim of privilege.2 8 The
rule should be the same regardless of the theory under which the
Government brings the suit. The waiver theory might presage a
doctrine that the Government waives any claim to determine
questions of privilege. Under this theory the court could examine
the evidence before ruling, thus leaving no need for a blanket
denial of the existence of the privilege whether the Government
acts in its proprietary or its law enforcing role.
C. THE PRVmLEGE IN Civn CASES WHmN THE GOVEINENT
Is THE DEEDANT
When the Government is a defendant in a civil action, it is
generally held subject to discovery and subpoena in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual. 9 There
is, of course, no waiver of the state secrets privilege.' Yet when
124. 10 & 11 Geo. 5 c. 75 (1920).
125. United States v. Cotton Valley Operator's Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719
(WD. La. 1949), af'd by an equally divided court, 389 U.S. 940 (1950).
126. 142 F. Supp. 551 (D. Md. 1956).
127. See Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. IRuv. 194 (1954); Comment, 18 U. CuI. L. Rv.
122 (1950).
128. Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d 513, 516 (8th Cir. 1958); O'Neill v. United
States, 79 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa. 1948); Fleming v. Bernardi, 4 F.R.D. 270
(N.D. Ohio 1941). But see General Eng'r, Inc. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 867, 876
(9th Cir. 1965).
129. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964). It is sometimes argued that the Government is
immune from discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This
position is completely demolished in Berger & Krash, supra note 77; Note, 41
VA. L. Itv. 507 (1955).
180. United States v. Reynolds, supra note 129; Note, 41 VA. L. Rav. 507
(1955).
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the Government is a party the court has considerable latitude in
dealing with claims of privilege since it may assess procedural
penalties.' 31 These sanctions are available if the court finds that
the claim is unjustified or that it requires further investigation of
evidence which the Government fails to produce. It is clear, how-
ever, that the Government as defendant ordinarily should be
allowed to claim the state secrets privilege without suffering
procedural penalties.
The Invention Secrecy Act of 1951112 provides that the Patent
Office may refuse to disclose information contained in patent
applications when specified officials believe that disclosure would
be detrimental to the national security. If an invention warrants
a patent but must remain secret, the Patent Office will notify the
inventor that the claims in his patent application are allowable,
but a patent will not issue until the necessity for secrecy ceases.
Thus, the inventor cannot exploit his invention 33 In order to
protect the inventor and to encourage the discovery of inventions
having military applications, the inventor whose patent has been
withheld under a secrecy order may obtain compensation from
the United States - both for withholding the patent and for any
use by the Government. The act outlines administrative proce-
dures for securing such compensation and also allows suits to be
brought in the district courts. In Halpern v. United States,134 the
court stated that an inventor would be allowed to maintain an
action for compensation in district court during the pendency
of the secrecy order as soon as an administrative award was denied
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1) authorizes a finding of contempt. Rule
37(b)(2) provides that:
the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just,
and among others the following: (i) An order that the matters regarding
which the questions were asked, or the character or description of the
thing or land, or the contents of the paper .... or any other designated
facts shall be taken to be established for purposes of the action in
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (ii) An
order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose desig-
nated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evi-
dence designated documents or things or items of testimony ...
(iii) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or pro-
ceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against
the disobedient party ....
132. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1964).
133. If the inventor starts making and selling his invention, he will almost
certainly run afoul of 18 U.S.C. 798 (1964), which -bars disclosure of classified
information, i.e., the patented device, to unauthorized persons.
134. 25s F.d s6 (2d Cir. 1958).
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or if the award was unsatisfactory to the inventor. The court
further held that such a trial should be conducted in camera. The
Government would not be able to avail itself of the state secrets
privilege if the court decided the trial could be held without sub-
stantial risk that secret information would be publicly divulged.
The court reasoned that the Invention Secrecy Act was designed
to encourage inventions of military application. Delaying court
proceedings until the secrecy order was rescinded would be con-
trary to this legislative purpose. It was also felt the litigation
would not make the information public since the plaintiff was the
inventor. Substantial risk of disclosure might result, however, if
the plaintiff's lawyer was a poor security risk.'35 More important-
ly, the court might refuse to try the case if the Government could
convince it that plaintiff's invention was outmoded by a new
invention, the details or even the very existence of which should
not be revealed. The result in Halpern has been praised, but its
method of statutory construction in reaching that result, and its
alleged disregard for the spirit of Reynolds have been criticized.136
Though the Invention Secrecy Act and Halpern cover only
patent infringement suits concerned with matters of military
technology, this type of case most commonly raises state secrets
privilege problems. 37 If litigation permitted under the act were
brought under other law, it would encompass both suits against
the Government and suits between private parties. Insofar as the
act brings the Government into suits which would normally in-
volve only private parties, it eases the difficulty of enforcing dis-
covery orders.
It may be wise to allow the opposing party an option to con-
tinue the lawsuit or to postpone the litigation until the need for
secrecy has lapsed. When the Government as a civil party success-
fully invokes the privilege, the statute of limitations should then
be tolled. Admittedly the private party has the unpleasant choice
of going forth without the evidence or waiting for the privileged
185. The inventor would probably not have to reveal secret details of his
invention to his lawyer for purposes of drawing a complaint or drafting a
request for administrative award. If the inventor did reveal such details he
might be violating 35 U.S.C. § 182, or § 186 (1964), which provide penalties
for unauthorized disclosure of -secret inventions. This situation will not arise
if plaintiff's lawyer originally drafted -the patent application.
186. 59 Corum. L. Ruv. 852 (1959).
137. In re Grove, 180 Fed. 62 (3d Cir. 1910); Pollen v. Ford Instrument
Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.DIN.Y. 1939); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 199 Fed. 353 (ED. Pa. 1912); Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl.
673 (1937).
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material to become available - during which time other evidence
may dissipate. Such a choice should not often be necessary be-
cause under proper standards most sensitive information requires
secrecy for short periods of time, at most three or four years. The
rationale of such a statute is that it may aid a private party by
counterbalancing the Government's special privilege to withhold
information. Consequently, the statute should not apply in suits
between private parties when evidence is withheld by a disin-
terested Government. It would be manifestly unfair to allow
the option to one party even though the other party never had
the right to claim the privilege.
IV. RECENT TRENDS
The Government's evidentiary privileges are matters of great
uncertainty and ardent debate. Each privilege has its distinct
scope, justification, and shade of legal imprimatur. An inherent
danger is the potential use of the state secrets privilege to sustain
the withholding of evidence which may justifiably be withheld
only under an official information or executive privilege. 8 Such
actions result in the unreasoned and undesirable expansion of
governmental privileges. Privileges are detrimental to a litigation
system in the first place since they exclude useful evidence. In a
democracy governmental privileges are especially undesirable un-
less supported by appropriate policies. The policies of protecting
national welfare in the military and diplomatic fields are clearly
irrelevant to the policies supporting the secrecy of official informa-
tion. The problems and disadvantages of governmental privileges
demand that each species of privilege be incorporated into law
only after painstaking examination of the policies which justify it.
It is difficult to predict the effect on the state secrets privilege
of the recent trends towards expanding discovery against the Gov-
ernment. Originally, the judiciary was concerned about the loss of
governmental efficiency resulting from excessive demands for
information, or from the disclosure of intragovernmental commu-
nications and confidential sources of information. Recently, judi-
cial concern has shifted to preserving fairness in litigation; as a
consequence the Government has been less successful in resisting
discovery. The magnitude of the interests protected by the state
secrets privilege, however, makes any analogy to other govern-
mental privileges hazardous. It is one thing to sacrifice govern-
mental efficiency to assure fair litigation; it is another to endanger
138. E.g., Dayton v. Dulles, 254 F2d 71 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
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the nation to preserve the integrity of a litigation system. This
does not mean that the Government may not have to pay a price
for the right to invoke the privilege; but before the exercise of the
state secrets privilege would be affected, a court would have to
come very close to ruling that no interest, however great, justifies
allowing the Government to invoke successfully a privilege with-
out suffering procedural penalties. To the extent that recent de-
velopments in expanding discovery against the Government rest
upon limited judgments that specific interests such as efficiency
do not justify privilege without penalty, the state secrets privilege
remains unaffected.
CONCLUSION
There is no greater reason for secrecy than protecting the mili-
tary and diplomatic welfare of the nation. Thus, if any privilege
based on the Government's need for secrecy can be justified, it is
clearly the state secrets privilege. The problems that have arisen
in connection with the privilege are, for the most part, avoidable.
The reason they have not been avoided is that no one in the
executive branch or the judicial branch wants to take upon him-
self the responsibility for authorizing or forcing disclosure of any
matter that might affect the national security. Yet the refusal
to undertake this responsibility, although understandable, has
not avoided a hard decision; it merely means that the decision
to withhold has been made without thought. It is the conclusion
of this writer that a careful and wise decision on the exercise of
the privilege can be made; it should ultimately be made by a
judge; it should be based upon the specific nature of the evidence
to be disclosed, the role it will play in the litigation, and the
degree to which it will be disclosed in the litigation process.
[Vol. 50:875
